'Double activation': Workfare meets marketisation by Mc Gann, Michael
Administration, vol. 69, no. 2 (2021), pp. 19–42 
doi: 10.2478/admin-2021-0012 
 










Since the financial crisis, Ireland’s welfare state has been reorientated around 
a regulatory, ‘work-first’ activation model. Claimants now face penalty rates 
for non-compliance with activation requirements that have been significantly 
extended since 2009. Alongside these formal policy reforms, the organisations 
delivering Public Employment Services, and the modes by which they are 
commissioned, have also been reconfigured through a series of New Public 
Management style governance reforms, including, most notably, the creation 
of a quasi-market for employment services (JobPath) in 2015. This article 
addresses the intersection between activation and quasi-marketisation, 
positioning the latter as a form of ‘double activation’ that reshapes not only 
how but also what policies are enacted at the street level. It unpacks their 
shared logics and mutual commitment to governing agents at a distance 
through a behavioural public policy orientation, and reflects on the extent to 
which marketisation is capable of producing lower-cost but more responsive 
employment services.  
 
Keywords: Activation, double activation, commodification, JobPath, 
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Introduction  
Activation is again on the political agenda, following the Labour 
Market Advisory Council’s call for existing contracted job-search 
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assistance programmes to be extended to meet a looming ‘long-term 
unemployment challenge’ and the immediate need of reintegrating 
workers displaced as a result of the Covid pandemic (Labour Market 
Advisory Council, 2020, p. 24). This focus on responding to the 
challenges of long-term unemployment through labour activation is 
only a recent cornerstone of welfare policy in Ireland. It reflects a 
major recalibration of welfare policy and institutions since the 
financial crisis that is emblematic of what Brodkin (2013b, p. 12) 
characterises as an unfolding ‘global workfare project’. By this she 
means international convergence upon a model of activation driven by 
payment cuts, tighter eligibility conditions, and sanctions for non-
compliance with mandatory job-searching and other behavioural 
requirements (cf. Bonoli, 2010). 
Until 2009 Ireland’s activation model was ‘low-intensity’. Training 
and employment programmes were highly fragmented and siloed from 
benefits administration, and there was minimal implementation of 
conditionality by OECD standards (Cousins, 2019; Martin, 2015). 
However, the combination of a threefold increase in unemployment, 
collapse in state revenue and policy influence of the troika (the 
International Monetary Fund, European Commission and European 
Central Bank) provided a policy window for a ‘rapid turn to austerity’ 
(Dukelow & Considine, 2014, p. 56). This unfolded under the guise of 
the Pathways to Work reforms and against the backdrop of a 
memorandum of understanding that insisted upon activation reform 
as a bailout condition. Commencing in late 2009, and accelerating 
from 2010 to 2013, the rate of jobseekers’ payments was progressively 
reduced, eligibility conditions for the One Parent Family Payment 
were tightened, and penalty rates were legislated for claimants who 
refused to participate in new activation measures (Cousins, 2019). 
Boland & Griffin (2018, p. 101) liken the impact of these social 
security changes to a transformation in ‘the entire spirit of welfare’, 
and there is now a growing body of sociological work examining how 
these policy shifts have been experienced by claimants (for example, 
see Boland & Griffin, 2018; Finn, this issue; Whelan, 2021). However, 
a parallel development which has received less attention is the 
governance reforms to how Public Employment Services (PES) are 
delivered that have unfolded alongside these changes (see Table 1). 
These include the consolidation of income support and employment 
supports into a one-stop activation service and, of focus in this article, 
the commissioning of a new Payment-by-Results employment services 
market (JobPath). The comparative lack of attention given to these 
reforms (although see Murphy & Hearne, 2019; Wiggan, 2015b) 
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reflects a wider ‘blind spot’ in international research on activation, 
which tends to treat operational reforms aimed at enhancing service 
efficiency in isolation from substantive policy shifts (Bredgaard & 
Larsen, 2007). For instance, a report by the Economic and Social 
Research Institute demarcates between ‘changes to how benefit and 
employment services are delivered’ versus ‘what types of employment 
services are delivered’ (Kelly et al., 2019, p. 1). However, this conceals 
how operational governance reforms reshape not only how (and by 
whom) services are delivered but also what services are delivered.  
Those who study the street-level delivery of activation position 
service providers and case managers as ‘de facto policymakers’ 
(Brodkin, 2013a, p. 23; van Berkel, 2013, p. 88) who continue the 
process of policymaking as services and benefits are delivered. As 
students of street-level bureaucracy argue, policy rarely arrives ‘fully 
formed’ but takes shape through how it is translated and enacted by a 
plurality of actors at the ground level (Newman, 2007, p. 365). Rules 
and regulations are rarely as tight as policy designers intend, leaving 
workers to navigate between often ambiguous and conflicting policy 
directions and the complexities of specific cases. As Zacka (2017, p. 
247) argues, policy delivery is therefore ‘suffused by moments of 
policymaking’, the shape of which will depend on the street-level 
contexts (organisational environments, work cultures, professional 
identities of frontline staff) surrounding implementation.  
 
Table 1: Activation policy and PES governance reforms 2009–16  
Year      Formal policy changes                  Reforms of operational services  
2009      Jobseeker’s Allowance (JA)      LES come under National  
              reduced by 51 per cent for         Employment Action Plan.  
              claimants aged 18–19.                  
                                                                     
2010      JA reduced for claimants  
              aged 18–21 (by 51 per cent)  
              and 22–24 years (by 30 per  
              cent).  
 
              Penalty rates introduced  
              for claimants.                                
                                                                     
2011      One Parent Family Payment  
              (OFP) eligibility restricted  
              to lone parents with children  
              under 18.                                        
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Table 1: Activation policy and PES governance reforms 2009–16 
(Contd.)  
Year      Formal policy changes                  Reforms of operational services  
2012      Pathways to Work 2012–16         FÁS, the National Training and 
              launched, introducing mutual   Employment Authority, dissolved. 
              commitments for claimants       Premises and employment support 
              to participate in activation         staff transferred to DSP, along 
              and sign personal progression   with community welfare offices 
              plans.                                             from the Health Service Executive. 
 
                                                                    Launch of Intreo, one-stop 
activation service. 
                                                                     
2013      OFP eligibility restricted to       Client job placement and  
              lone parents with children         progression targets introduced for 
              under 7 on a phased basis.          LES.  
                                                                    DSP commences tendering process 
for a Payment-by-Results 
employment service, JobPath. 
                                                                     
2014      Introduction of Jobseeker’s       Seetec and Turas Nua awarded  
              Transition Payment for lone      initial four-year JobPath contracts. 
              parents with children aged  
              7 to 14.                                           
                                                                     
2015                                                             JobPath launches. 
                                                                     
2016      Pathways to Work 2016–20         LES client outcome targets 
              launched.                                      restricted to job placements only.   
Source: Author, adapted from Boland & Griffin (2015), Cousins (2019), 
Dukelow & Considine (2014), Indecon (2018), Wiggan (2015b). 
 
Taking this significance of street-level delivery as our starting point, 
this article conceptualises the administrative turn towards 
marketisation as a form of ‘double activation’ (cf. Considine et al., 
2015; van Berkel, 2013). This perspective views the turn towards a 
more regulatory welfare state as a function not only of the legislative 
project of conditioning income support on work-related conditionality 
but also of strategies of public management reform aimed at 
disciplining the agency of service providers. I argue that it is no mere 
coincidence that, as countries have embraced ‘workfare’, they have 
also looked to organise its delivery via social services markets. The 
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policy turn, towards workfare, and the administrative turn, towards 
marketisation, share conceptual symmetries. Both constitute projects 
of commodifying claimants’ labour which are animated by a shared 
theory of agency that seeks to discipline the behaviours of recalcitrant 
welfare and administrative subjects. In what follows, I review how 
Ireland’s PES have been reorganised before introducing the concept 
of ‘double activation’. I then unpack the shared commitments of 
workfare and marketisation to commodifying jobseekers via strategies 
of behavioural governance before reflecting on how marketisation 
reshapes what employment services are delivered to citizens at the 
street level.  
 
The administrative turn towards marketisation 
Ireland’s PES are delivered by a mixed economy of public, community 
and now private sector providers. The incorporation of not-for-profit 
organisations within Ireland’s PES supply chain dates to the mid 
1990s, when Local Employment Services (LES) were established in 
parallel to the National Training and Employment Authority (FÁS) to 
provide intensive guidance to those with greater barriers, who 
participated voluntarily (Indecon, 2018). However, in 2009 the LES, 
which are operated by twenty-two local development and community 
organisations, were brought under the National Employment Action 
Plan, enabling claimants to be referred for mandatory activation. Since 
then, LES have been contracted annually by the Department of Social 
Protection (DSP) on a ‘costs-met’ basis (Indecon, 2018, p. iii). In 
recent years they have also been subject to more intensive 
performance monitoring and measurement as part of a widening 
emphasis across government on performance management and on 
holding public services accountable for outcomes and costs 
(MacCarthaigh, 2017).  
As MacCarthaigh (2017, p. 149) observes, ‘issues of political and 
administrative reform’ were an important part of the 2011 election, 
with all parties detailing major public sector reform initiatives as part 
of their manifestos. Upon coming to office, the newly elected Fine 
Gael/Labour government set out a programme of government that 
would make Ireland’s public sector ‘more transparent, accountable 
and efficient’ by ‘pin[ning] down accountability for results at every 
level of the public service’ (Government of Ireland, 2011, p. 28). It 
established the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform 
(DPER) to spearhead a programme of major organisational reform 
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and rationalisation, focused on strengthening performance 
management and leveraging outsourcing to reduce costs. From 2013 
all departments were required to periodically publish performance 
statements. Although community rather than public organisations, 
LES had performance targets written into their annual contracts. 
Initially, LES were targeted with placing or progressing at least 50 per 
cent of their clients into work or training. However, since 2016, their 
performance has been measured solely in job placements (Indecon, 
2018).  
One of the most significant post-2011 public sector reform 
initiatives was the creation of Intreo (Köppe & MacCarthaigh, 2019). 
This unfolded against the backdrop of a FÁS governance and 
corporate travel expenses scandal, which culminated in the resignation 
of its director (Köppe & MacCarthaigh, 2019). FÁS was subsequently 
dissolved, and its employment services functions consolidated with 
DSP’s benefits administration services to create a new one-stop 
service. The Intreo service rolled out from late 2012, creating sixty new 
PES offices. However, the surge in claimant numbers meant that each 
caseworker was still responsible for approximately 1,000 clients – an 
exceptionally high ratio by international standards (Department of 
Employment Affairs and Social Protection (DEASP), 2019, p. 8). 
Ireland’s public sector lacked the capacity to provide the level of 
services needed, especially given a public sector hiring freeze. DSP 
therefore decided to contract specialist employment services for the 
long-term unemployed that would be funded through Payment-by-
Results, reserving Intreo for claimants registered for less than twelve 
months. While the decision to competitively tender JobPath was partly 
taken due to a lack of capacity within existing public services, it also 
aligned with the government’s ‘post-2011 reorganisation agenda’ 
(Köppe & MacCarthaigh, 2019, p. 147) of harnessing external services 
to achieve ‘a more cost effective and flexible approach’ (DPER, 2011, 
p. 14). The foundations of this commitment to contracting-out were 
laid by an advisory group appointed under the previous government, 
which had called for outsourcing to be actively pursued in each area of 
public services in order to achieve ‘significant efficiencies and savings 
on the delivery of schemes’ (McCarthy et al., 2009, p. 21).  
In December 2013 organisations with an annual turnover of €20 
million were invited to bid for JobPath contracts (Wiggan, 2015b). 
Bidders were given indicative volumes of referrals across six client 
groups (varying by risk of long-term unemployment) and asked to 
submit price bids for registration fees and outcome/sustainment 
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payments (DSP, 2013). Four-year contracts to deliver JobPath in two 
divisions were subsequently awarded to two private agencies: Seetec, a 
for-profit agency, and Turas Nua, which was a partnership between 
the UK-based Working Links and FRS Recruitment (an Irish 
cooperative). Both Seetec and Working Links also delivered the UK 
Work Programme, a programme ‘bearing a striking resemblance to 
JobPath’ (Lowe, 2015, p. 117).  
JobPath commenced in July 2015, constituting a new PES quasi-
market. ‘Quasi-markets’ differ from conventional markets in several 
ways (Le Grand & Bartlett, 1993a). Two key differences are that 
purchasing power is typically concentrated in a single ‘monopsony’ 
purchaser that can fix demand, while service users rarely purchase 
services directly but rely on the government acting as a proxy 
purchaser. In the case of JobPath, claimants are referred on the basis 
of random sampling and participation is mandatory (DEASP, 2019, p. 
8). While PES quasi-markets frequently share these features, they can 
nevertheless take varied forms depending on how policymakers 
structure the intersection between performance-based payment 
models, competition, choice and regulation (Wiggan, 2015a). In 
particular, the balance of power between service users, the state and 
market providers can be adjusted through varying transactional 
elements such as the length of contracts; the degree of service 
specification and monitoring by government; the performance 
incentives in payment models; and whether providers are procured via 
competitive tendering, closed contracting or user vouchers (Greer et 
al., 2017). Purchasing services via vouchers, for example, gives service 
users greater influence over the quality of services compared with 
centrally contracted quasi-markets in which government simply directs 
claimants ‘to the provision it has bought’ (Wiggan, 2015a, p. 115). 
Conversely, in quasi-markets that are contracted on a ‘black box’ basis 
– where providers are held financially accountable for outcomes rather 
than procedurally accountable for service content – providers exercise 
greater control over what services are produced than in more 
regulated markets (Wiggan, 2015b, 2015a).  
JobPath embedded market governance in two ways: through 
introducing competitive tendering and by commissioning delivery via 
outcomes-based contracting – a specific form of marketisation 
distinguished by the contingency of providers’ payments on achieving 
results. In the case of JobPath, payments for sustaining clients from 
thirteen to fifty-two weeks in employment account for more than 90 
per cent of the €3,718 total possible payments per client (DEASP, 
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2019, p. 17). Although, due to the low percentage of participants who 
actually sustain employment for fifty-two weeks, the average payment 
per client is only a fraction of this (€780), of which €311 is comprised 
of registration payments. Nevertheless, this payment model creates a 
financial imperative for JobPath providers to achieve outcomes in a 
way that LES are insulated from. However, one important difference 
to related PES quasi-markets is that JobPath is not internally 
competitive. Unlike Australia, where there are several providers per 
region, Seetec and Turas Nua each enjoy ‘monopoly-like delivery 
responsibility for half of the country’ (Murphy & Hearne, 2019, p. 
448). If services are of poor quality, ‘there is absolutely no alternative’ 
(Lowe, 2015, p. 120) to which DSP can turn. The reasons for this are 
several. One concern was that including more than one provider per 
region would make the contracts less attractive to potential bidders, 
especially in regions outside Dublin characterised by low-density, 
depressed labour markets. Including only one contractor per region 
also made the contract less demanding to manage, and DSP had little 
experience in managing Payment-by-Results programmes (Lowe, 
2015). Given the role that a competitive market with ‘a sufficiently 
large number of service providers’ (Struyven & Steurs, 2005, p. 214) is 
theorised to play in driving innovation in PES quasi-markets, it can be 
asked whether a market governance approach was best suited to the 
dynamics of Ireland’s geography and labour market.  
Nevertheless, the contract included one innovative mechanism that 
DSP could use to sanction providers for poor quality. Under the 
contract terms, 15 per cent of providers’ payments could be reclaimed 
for poor ratings in user-satisfaction surveys. This clause gave DSP a 
mechanism to hold providers financially accountable for not only 
‘hard’ employment outcomes but also softer client-satisfaction and 
service-quality outcomes, potentially mitigating any disposition 
providers may have had towards using sanctions to ‘hassle’ clients into 
work, or towards ‘parking’ clients with greater employment needs 
(since these practices may adversely affect user ratings). A further 
check on quality was JobPath’s ‘grey-box’ design (Lowe, 2015, p. 122), 
in that minimum service standards that all clients could expect (e.g. 
concerning personal progression plans and frequency of meetings) 
were specified and enforceable by DSP through caseload audits and 
spot checks of offices. Hence, Wiggan (2015b) observes that JobPath 
represents ‘a more cautious embrace of market rationality’ than the 
UK’s ‘black-box’ programme.  
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Currently, PES delivery remains hybrid in form although there are 
signs that marketisation is gaining an increasing foothold. The €57.4 
million paid to JobPath providers in 2017 constituted almost 40 per 
cent of total activation expenditure, surpassing expenditure on Intreo 
services and representing more than three times the cost of LES 
(Lavelle & Callaghan, 2018). JobPath and LES contracts were due to 
expire in December 2020, and a review of contracted services was 
underway when Covid struck in March 2020. This review was expected 
to recommend an expansion of marketisation, with indications that 
not only future JobPath but also LES contracts would be competitively 
procured. An earlier review of LES had recommended giving active 
consideration to a ‘competitive procurement model for future 
provision of services’ (Indecon, 2018, p. xiii). Likewise, an official 
evaluation, drawing on outcome data for those referred in Q1 2016, 
concluded JobPath was ‘effective in supporting long-term unemployed 
people secure work’ as measured by their rate of employment and 
earnings, with the former estimated to be 20 to 26 per cent higher than 
comparatively matched cohorts who did not participate (DEASP, 
2019, p. x). However, in raw terms, and drawing on outcome data for 
all referrals between July 2015 and December 2016, analysis by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General (2018, p. 143) found that only 25 
per cent of participants commenced some form of employment, and 
just 7 per cent sustained employment for fifty-two weeks. Notably, 
these results occurred during a period of recovery, when participants 
were job-searching ‘in favourable conditions’ (DEASP, 2019, p. 59). 
Early JobPath cohorts also included high proportions of clients with 
few barriers other than a lack of work – the participants with which the 
international evaluation literature suggests job-search programmes 
work best – whereas their efficacy for those with complex employment 
challenges is more uncertain (Martin, 2015).  
 
Double activation 
The pattern of PES marketisation following upon the coat-tails of a 
workfarist activation turn is well trodden internationally (Bredgaard & 
Larsen, 2007; Greer et al., 2017). Such is the historical symbiosis 
between workfare and marketisation that Brodkin (2013b, p. 13) 
characterises the latter ‘movement of governance and management 
reform’ as the second track of the global workfare project, observing 
that it may be eclipsing policy differences across countries in terms of 
‘changing the practices of workfare and activation’. For Bredgaard & 
Larsen (2007), quasi-markets constitute governance instruments for 
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circumventing corporatist political structures and other barriers to 
implementing contested workfare policies, such as frontline workers’ 
professional social work ethic. As discussed in further detail later, they 
do so by sidelining (unionised) public sector workers from policy 
implementation in favour of private actors, who are perceived as more 
motivated by economic incentives and less averse to using sanctions 
‘and other motivational initiatives’ (Bredgaard & Larsen, 2007, p. 
294). Soss et al. (2013, p. 139) likewise view workfare and 
marketisation reforms ‘as two sides of a single political project’, one 
that various scholars have dubbed ‘double activation’ (Considine et al., 
2015, p. 29). This expression captures how the project of activation 
‘now extends beyond the unemployed individuals who are policy’s 
official subjects’ (Brodkin, 2013b, p. 11) to ‘the organisations and 
frontline staff involved in policy implementation’ (van Berkel, 2013, p. 
100). Below, I elaborate on the conceptual symmetries linking these 




Workfare is often criticised as a strategy for the ‘administrative re-
commodification’ (Holden, 2003, p. 314) of labour that is less 
concerned with ‘creating jobs for people who don’t have them’ than 
with ‘creating workers for jobs that nobody wants’ (Peck, 2001, p. 6). 
This argument draws on Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare states, 
which differentiates between regimes according to the extent to which 
they permit citizens to subsist independently of the market. From this 
perspective, the post-war era was regarded as a period of de-
commodification insofar as enhanced access to benefits and 
investment in public services provided a substitute for wages and 
services that would otherwise have to be purchased. However, 
workfare policies reposition the welfare state as ‘a commodifying 
agent’ (Holden, 2003, p. 307) by deploying its institutional levers to 
press claimants into joining what critical political economists, 
following Marx, term ‘the reserve army of labour’ (Greer, 2016, p. 
163). This is the surplus population of non-employed workers that 
serves as a readily available supply of labour for employers in 
expanding areas of the economy. The size and material conditions of 
this reserve army structure the level of labour market discipline and 
the degree to which employers can extract profit from acquiring 
labour. Workfare policies reinforce this mechanism by negating 
‘welfare as a viable alternative’ (Soss et al., 2011, p. 46), thereby 
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intensifying labour market competition to put downward pressure on 
wages and conditions.  
PES quasi-markets further accentuate the commodification of 
claimants by turning non-employed labour into a commodity that can 
be acquired by third parties and ‘sold on’ for profit. When employment 
services are tendered, jobseekers are effectively organised into 
purchasing lots and the ‘options’ to sell them to employers are bid on 
by prospective providers. Successful bidders win the right to try and 
enhance jobseekers’ employability, and sell them for profit in the very 
real sense of earning sustainment payments that are higher than the 
investments they have made in ‘improving’ those clients. By paying 
agencies lucrative payments for placing non-employed labour in work, 
quasi-markets transform surplus labour ‘into matter with exchange 
value’ (Adkins, 2017, p. 300). Marketisation enables third parties to 
extract surplus value from jobseekers’ labour beyond the profit 
derived by employers, and to maximise profits by finding increasingly 
efficient means of buying and selling the unemployed. On average, 
JobPath providers earn €613 when clients sustain thirteen weeks of 
employment, a further €737 at twenty-six weeks, rising to an 
additional €1,165 if clients sustain employment for fifty-two weeks 
(DEASP, 2019). For providers, the value of the JobPath contracts 
consists largely in their ability to convert referrals into sustainment 
payments at low cost.  
Quasi-markets thus facilitate the hyper-commodification of 
claimants. Workfare policies press claimants into selling their labour 
through conduct conditions that penalise non-employment, while the 
creation of quasi-markets extends how claimants’ labour becomes ‘an 
object of calculation and exchange’ (Adkins, 2017, p. 300) by 
configuring a space in which intermediaries can acquire and trade 
claimants’ labour ‘in a manner that any other commodity might be sold 
in “free” markets’ (Grover, 2009, p. 501). Quasi-markets thus do more 
than just streamline the administrative re-commodification of 
claimants. They transform the ‘commodity status’ of claimants’ labour 
by configuring an intermediary market that multiplies how surplus 
labour is acquired for profit. This third-party profiting from the 
exchange of labour has, of course, been a central aspect of the labour 
hire industry since the early 1900s. But whereas labour hire workers 
engage voluntarily with recruitment agencies, claimants have little 
choice but to cooperate in their state-sponsored hyper-
commodification (cf. Grover, 2009, pp. 500–1).  
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Governing at a distance  
A second parallel between the paradigms of workfare and 
marketisation concerns their underlying theories of agency and 
motivation. Both diagnose an agency problem in relation to welfare 
(claimants) and administrative (service workers) subjects that locates 
the source of unemployment in a misalignment between 
environmental incentives and agents’ self-interest. They also each view 
agency ‘as a site of disciplinary control’ that can be governed through 
economic incentives that appeal to agents’ ‘purposive rationality’ 
(Morris, 2020, p. 276). In particular, the turn towards ‘activating’ 
claimants via job-search conditionality is closely associated with 
‘underclass’ theories that position claimants as pathologically work-
shy. The arguments advanced by Murray (1984) and Mead (1986) 
concerning the causes of welfare dependence have been influential in 
this regard.  
In Losing Ground, Murray positioned claimants as calculating 
‘freeloaders’ who wilfully choose welfare over work given the value of 
benefits compared with the low wages available in peripheral 
employment. Murray saw welfare as a choice made by self-seeking 
claimants acting in response ‘to the reality of the world around them’ 
(1984, p. 162). The solution, as he saw it, was to make work pay, by 
reducing benefits and enforcing work obligations. In Beyond 
Entitlement, Mead advanced a more subtle view of claimants’ agency, 
arguing that they genuinely aspired to work but were demoralised by 
the ‘belief that their fate turns on forces outside of themselves’ (1986, 
p. 146). Rather than a utility-maximising choice, Mead saw benefit 
dependence as a ‘moral hazard’ that induced loss of motivation. 
Nevertheless, Mead shared Murray’s scepticism that claimants could 
be trusted ‘to work reliably unless programmes require them to do so’ 
(1986, p. 13). Put differently, central to the justification for conduct 
conditionality is the assertion of claimants’ ‘bad agency’ (Wright, 2012, 
p. 316). The ‘problem’ to be addressed is the permissiveness of passive 
entitlements that foster dependence. What I want to suggest is that a 
related problematisation of the agency of service workers underpins 
the New Public Management (NPM) reform agenda within which PES 
marketisation is embedded.  
The introduction of quasi-markets reflects a broader governance 
shift in public administration that has been gaining traction since the 
early 1990s towards NPM and the ‘arm’s length’ (Bredgaard & Larsen, 
2007, p. 291) regulation of public service workers via contractualism, 
price competition and other performance management technologies. 
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This public management orientation derives from a view of agency 
drawn from public choice economics that assumes all people, 
regardless of which sector they work in, are instrumentally motivated 
to maximise their own utility. Accordingly, people’s behaviours must 
be interpreted as a function of the incentive structures in their 
environment and they must be governed as ‘knaves’ motivated by little 
more ‘than private interest’ (Le Grand, 1997, p. 149). This distrust of 
public sector workers as knavishly self-interested jarred with classical 
Weberian and Wilsonian models of public administration, which 
celebrated public servants as altruistic knights ‘driven by a form of 
public service motivation’ (Le Grand, 2010, p. 57). But public choice 
theory recast them as motivated by little more than the desire to 
increase their salaries, power and reputation, giving rise to a view of 
public sector organisations as being inimical to innovation and 
vulnerable to a series of principal–agent problems.  
Principal–agent problems arise when the interests of shareholders 
conflict with those hired to run enterprises upon their behalf. In listed 
companies, principals’ interests lie in maximising profitability to 
ensure higher dividends whereas managers seek to increase their 
wages and reduce their work intensity, undermining profitability. 
According to public choice economists, such agency dilemmas are 
especially acute in public sector organisations for several reasons. 
These include the information asymmetries that exist in large 
bureaucracies, the diffuse nature of the principal’s interests in the 
context of public services (where it is difficult to determine ‘who’ the 
principal is) and the public’s weak control over administrators. 
Importantly, public choice theory provided a framework for explaining 
policy failures as the fault of public service workers. If reforms failed, 
it was because they ‘did not serve the self-interest of the people 
delivering that policy’ (Le Grand, 2010, p. 60).  
To reduce this agency dilemma, proponents of NPM argued for 
stronger performance management within public administration: 
either through introducing performance measurement and 
performance-related pay within bureaucracies or, quintessentially, by 
subjecting public services to ‘private-sector competition’ (Struyven & 
Steurs, 2005, p. 212). The theory is that by contractualising the 
relationship between the principal (commissioner) and the agent 
(providers), performance incentives such as results-based payment 
models, provider competition for contracts and clients, and penalties 
for breaching contractual clauses can align the private interests of 
street-level organisations and their staff with public policy goals. 
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Payment-by-Results funding models are an archetypal example. 
Although applied at an organisational level, it is assumed that agencies 
in quasi-markets will ‘in one way or another send signals to workers 
about the performance expected from them’ (van Berkel & Knies, 
2016, p. 63). This should ensure that frontline workers focus on 
achieving programme outcomes and delivering value for the 
purchaser. Likewise, performance-based contracting should reduce 
the overall cost of programme delivery through price competition and 
financially incentivising providers ‘to adopt program improvements 
that work’ (Soss et al., 2011, p. 210). In this way, quasi-markets 
embody the alleged invisible hand of the market ‘whereby, simply 
through pursuing their own advantage, suppliers are led to contribute 
to socially desirable ends’ (Le Grand, 1997, p. 159). Thus, much like 
workfare presumes a model of welfare subjects that emphasises 
claimants’ perceived ‘motivational deficiencies’ (Wright, 2012, p. 321), 
the marketisation of PES presumes a model of the administrative 
subject that assumes service workers ‘cannot be trusted to do their job 
properly without outside intervention’ (Le Grand, 2010, p. 60). Both 
‘are cut from the same neoliberal cloth’ (Soss et al., 2013, p. 138) of 
governing deviant agents through disciplining their calculative self-
interest: positioning claimants as ‘units of (paid) labour which need to 
be financially incentivised to sell their labour and service providers as 
market agents which need to be financially incentivised to place 
people in paid work’ (Shutes & Taylor, 2014, p. 217). 
The extent to which public administration in Ireland has embraced 
these NPM ideas is contested (MacCarthaigh & Hardiman, 2020), 
although we can see underlying public choice theory ideas about 
public sector inefficiency, weak accountability and the need for 
subjecting public services delivery to stronger performance incentives 
being embraced under the post-2011 reform agenda. As 
MacCarthaigh (2017, p. 161) highlights, this unprecedented reform 
agenda was legitimated in terms of ‘a perceived problem of an 
underperforming public service’. Murphy et al. (2020, p. 17) highlight 
how post-crisis reform narratives packaged ‘normative ideas of 
transparency, efficiency, and accountability’ with cognitive ideas of 
value-for-money to drive a policy agenda of outsourcing and 
marketisation.  
The FÁS expenses scandal had weakened faith in public service 
motivation. In outlining its agenda for public sector reform, the 2011 
programme for government framed the problem as ensuring that 
public services serve ‘the common good, not sectional interests’, and 
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that concrete mechanisms were needed ‘to deal with persistent under-
performance’ (Government of Ireland, 2011, p. 28). In a pointed 
reference to the FÁS expenses scandal, it promised ‘no more “golden 
handshakes” for public servants that have failed to deliver’ and ‘a 
reformed incentive system’ for all public sector workers to encourage 
‘audited improvements in service delivery and cost-effectiveness’ 
(Government of Ireland, 2011, p. 29). It went on to explicitly reference 
ending fixed budgets for public service providers like ‘FÁS’, 
committing to ‘open up the delivery of public services to a range of 
providers’ and to fund services that ‘are tailored to better suit 
[citizens’] needs and less expensive for the taxpayer’ (Government of 
Ireland, 2011, pp. 29–30). In so doing, it tied the perceived 
underperformance of public services to a deficit of competition and 
accountability in how public services were funded. This problem 
framing has been continued through various public service reform 
plans, with DPER outlining the need to rebuild trust so that citizens 
can see that public services are ‘working efficiently and fairly’ (DPER, 
2014, p. 6). In its 2014 Public Sector Reform Plan, DPER specifically 
argued for ‘more commissioning than in the past’ and ‘a new approach 
based on releasing funds in return for delivering specific outcomes’ 
rather than traditional block grants for service providers. Pointedly, 
the plan cited JobPath’s Payment-by-Results model of ‘incentivising 
providers to find work for the maximum number of long-term 
unemployed people’ (DPER, 2014, p. 15) as a blueprint for future 
commissioning.  
 
Impacts of marketisation 
As we have seen, DSP’s decision to outsource the delivery of 
employment services for the longer-term unemployed was driven 
partly by a lack of existing PES capacity. However, the choice to 
commission this additional capacity via competitive tendering and 
Payment-by-Results also aligned with a broader public service reform 
agenda that was normatively orientated towards harnessing perform -
ance-based contracting to ‘obtain the best value for money’ (DPER, 
2014, p. 15) while achieving services that are more responsive to 
citizens’ needs. But can these dual goals of cheaper but more 
responsive services be simultaneously achieved through quasi-
markets? To conclude, I consider some of the tensions inherent to this 
strategy of ‘putting a public service at greater distance from the 
control of the state in order to increase its effectiveness’ (Considine  
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et al., 2015, p. 163). These include the transaction costs associated with 
managing PES quasi-markets as well as a more fundamental concern 
about the potential for marketisation to give rise to more regulatory 
and less flexible employment services rather than the highly 
individualised services depicted by proponents of quasi-marketisation.  
The theoretical framework of quasi-markets assumes that 
competition for clients and contracts motivates providers to innovate 
and to deliver more responsive services. This is under the presumption 
that providers in a competitive market will be incentivised to perform, 
and personalisation is important to ‘making activation processes 
successful’ (van Berkel & van Der Aa, 2005, p. 338). This requirement 
of a competitive market is critical to quasi-markets’ theorised potential 
to produce more innovative and efficient employment services. 
Maintaining this market competition, however, depends on quasi-
markets being continuously retendered so that they avoid becoming 
consolidated in the hands of a few ‘insider firms’ (Bennett, 2017, p. 
144). The more frequent and rigourous these tendering processes, the 
higher the transaction costs (writing tenders, preparing and assessing 
bids, negotiating contracts), indicating an unavoidable tension 
‘between the extent of the transaction costs and the intensity of 
competition’ (Struyven & Steurs, 2005, p. 218).  
However, beyond this problem of transaction costs, the assumption 
that competition will motivate providers to produce more flexible and 
responsive employment services is not without its problems. 
Experience from other countries that have experimented with quasi-
markets, most notably Australia and the UK, suggests that competitive 
tendering and outcomes-based contracting can lead to lower-quality 
and more standardised services as providers respond to the price 
signals in the contract and payment models by shedding their costs. 
One of the main ways that providers compete, particularly during 
tendering, is on price. Such price competition is welcomed by 
purchasers, who are keen to reduce costs. When tendering for Work 
Programme contracts, bidders frequently discounted job sustainment 
payments (Bennett, 2017) and potential providers were likewise 
encouraged to price bid during JobPath tendering. This need to 
compete on price, combined with the commercial imperative for 
agencies to generate profits from payments, provides an incentive for 
agencies to adopt ‘lean staffing … and inexpensive programme 
content’ (Fuertes & Lindsay, 2016, p. 536). By transferring the 
financial risk of programme delivery onto providers, and increasing 
the level of risk associated with long-term support measures, 
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outcomes-based funding models reinforce these incentives for 
providers to standardise their case management practices to reduce 
costs while enabling them to be implemented at larger scale by lower-
paid staff (Considine et al., 2020). Within this organisational context, 
the value of professional qualifications can be quickly diminished by 
client-classification instruments and other structured assessment tools 
designed to standardise decision-making and to replace ‘part of the 
skill set that a case manager might otherwise need’ (Considine et al., 
2011, p. 821). Here, Greer et al. (2017, p. 108) point to the danger of 
marketisation producing a ‘disorganisation of employment relations’ 
as responsibility for policy implementation is transferred away from 
public and community sector organisations with collectivised 
workforces towards lower-cost commercial providers with weak 
collective bargaining arrangements. Indeed, this was one of the main 
concerns raised by unions regarding the commissioning of JobPath, 
and the two main public services unions took DSP to arbitration on the 
grounds that the programme should have been delivered either by the 
new Intreo service or through the existing LES (Rogers, 2014).  
Data on whether JobPath has undermined the collective solidarity 
and qualification levels of frontline PES workers are not yet available. 
However, experience from earlier adopters of marketisation, including 
Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK, lends credence to 
this concern (Considine et al., 2015; Greer et al., 2017). In a study of 
the impacts of quasi-marketisation on Australian frontline PES 
workers, Considine et al. (2015, pp. 61–62) found that rates of union 
membership declined from 44.2 per cent in 1998 to 6.2 per cent in 
2012, while the proportion of frontline workers with a university 
degree also dropped markedly from 39.2 to 19.7 per cent. Greer et al. 
(2017, p. 9) link such processes of deskilling and de-collectivisation to 
‘the intensification of management control’ over labour autonomy 
within PES quasi-markets. Community and public sector organisations 
employing staff with formal social work or guidance counselling 
qualifications fail to win contracts and ‘drop out of the market’ to be 
replaced by commercial providers who favour ‘“results-oriented” staff’ 
from backgrounds such as retail, sales, telemarketing or human 
resources (Greer et al., 2017, p. 110). As van Berkel argues, these 
changes in workers’ occupational backgrounds ‘might not be without 
consequences for welfare-to-work practices’ (2017, p. 23). Studies 
from both liberal and Nordic welfare states indicate that less 
experienced caseworkers and those without professional social work 
qualifications are more likely to blame unemployment on jobseekers’ 
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lack of motivation and to believe that clients ‘need to be forced into 
the workforce’ (Kallio et al., 2013; McDonald & Marston, 2008,  
p. 320) than caseworkers with greater experience or social work 
qualifications, who attribute unemployment to more structural factors.  
Beyond eroding rates of union membership and qualification levels, 
quasi-marketisation can further weaken the labour autonomy of 
frontline workers by tightening management control over their work 
through intensive performance measurement. While intended to 
increase the transparency and accountability of frontline work, 
systems of performance measurement can also redirect the focus of 
caseworkers’ decision-making towards meeting organisational needs 
rather than responding to clients’ needs. When performance is only 
counted in hard outcomes like job placements, an emphasis on rapid 
job placement (regardless of quality) may eclipse any disposition 
towards addressing clients’ personal issues or supporting them to build 
skills that may lead to more durable transitions. Interventions that 
would bring people closer to employment such as referrals to housing 
or counselling services may become neglected if the immediate 
performance pay-off of those interventions is uncertain. The upshot is 
policy practices with ‘more perceptibly hard edges’ (Brodkin, 2013b, p. 
6), with several studies suggesting that tighter performance 
management is linked to increased sanctioning of clients. For example, 
in a study of welfare-to-work caseworkers in Florida, Soss et al. (2013, 
p. 136) found that, lacking the resources and training to respond to 
clients’ real-life needs, caseworkers often turned frustratedly ‘to 
threats in the hope that compliance will ensue, [and] performance 
numbers will improve’.  
These street-level adaptations bring into view one of the most well-
documented concerns regarding PES quasi-markets: the use of 
frontline ‘selection practices’ (van Berkel & Knies, 2016, p. 64) to 
game performance metrics and payment models. Commonly referred 
to as ‘creaming’ and ‘parking’, this is where providers and frontline 
staff prioritise clients they perceive as nearest to employment because 
they are seen as more lucrative and easier for realising results. 
Conversely, clients perceived as more distant from employment are 
given only the minimum support necessary to secure registration 
payments. While public sector organisations are not immune from 
these adaptations to performance demands, especially when faced 
with heavy caseloads, the profit-seeking motive of private agencies, 
coupled with performance-based payment models, makes this 
problem a ‘perennial design challenge’ (Carter & Whitworth, 2015, p. 
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280) for quasi-markets in particular. Reducing the risks of providers 
‘creaming’ and ‘parking’ requires close government monitoring and 
regulation through detailed contractual specification of processes, 
developing auditing systems to verify outcomes, adjusting payment 
models and enforcing penalty clauses. As with ensuring the 
competitive dynamics of quasi-markets through retendering, this 
market regulation generates high transaction costs. While such 
monitoring costs are a feature of any market, they are magnified 
‘where information is imperfect and activity flows are uncertain’ (Le 
Grand & Bartlett, 1993b, p. 211) and where the transactions involved 
are ‘complex and multi-dimensional’ (Bartlett, 1991, p. 53). These 
conditions of bounded rationality and information asymmetry are 
inherent to PES markets, where the effects of interventions on client 
outcomes are not well understood, service quality is difficult to 
observe and the assessment of providers’ ‘true additionality is 
confounded by external factors such as the business cycle’ (Hill, 2013, 
p. 198).  
 
Conclusion 
Over the past decade, welfare reform in Ireland has exhibited a 
growing orientation towards a more regulatory activation model, not 
only at the level of enacted socal security reforms but also at the level 
of policy practices on the ground. This is reflected in an elevenfold 
increase in the number of penalty rates applied between 2012 and 2017 
despite declining claimant numbers (Cousins, 2019), although it is 
important not to overstate this disciplinary dynamic given that the 
overall level of sanctioning remains ‘very modest’ (Cousins, 2019, p. 
39) compared with other liberal welfare regimes. This policy turn 
towards workfare has been accompanied by an administrative turn 
towards marketisation in what we have conceptualised as a project of 
‘double activation’. Each involves the commodification of claimants’ 
labour through deploying policy instruments designed to discipline the 
calculative self-interest of welfare and administrative subjects. While 
marketisation reforms have been promoted as mechanisms for 
increasing the efficiency and responsiveness of PES, we have seen that 
quasi-markets also have inbuilt tendencies towards service 
standardisation due to the commerical imperatives for providers to cut 
costs. Of particular concern is the potential for policy implementation 
to be transferred towards agencies employing deskilled and non-
unionised workforces and subjecting them to tighter management 
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control. This reconfiguration of frontline workers’ labour autonomy 
and professional identities can carry substantive policy effects by 
disciplining caseworkers to focus on meeting short-term performance 
targets rather than flexibly responding to citizens’ personal needs. 
Positioning PES marketisation as a form of ‘double activation’ in this 
way underscores that ‘the practical is political’ (Brodkin, 2013a, p. 32). 
Quasi-marketisation may be introduced under the pretext of 
administrative efficiency but it is also ‘a form of policy politics’ 
(Brodkin, 2011, p. i273) that brings about changes of policy substance 
through administrative means.  
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